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1. Whether this Court should reaffirm its decision in 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978), and hold that the educational benefits that flow from 
a diverse student body to an institution of higher education, 
its students, and the public it serves, are sufficiently 
compelling to permit the school to consider race and/or 
ethnicity as one of many factors in making admissions 
decisions through a "properly devised" admissions program. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that 
the University of Michigan Law School's admissions 
program is properly devised. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
There is no genuine dispute in this case about the 
relevant historical facts, and the record evidence establishes 
three central realities that provide firm support for the 
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the admissions program in 
use at the University of Michigan Law School ("the Law 
School") does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
First, academic selectivity and student body diversity, 
including racial diversity, are both integral to the 
educational mission of the Law School. Second, the Law 
School successfully realizes both goals through an 
admissions program that is "virtually indistinguishable" 
from the Harvard plan that five Justices approved in 
Bakke. 1 It evaluates the potential contributions and 
academic promise of every individual and does not employ 
quotas or set-asides. Third, no honestly colorblind 
alternative policy could produce educationally meaningful 
racial diversity at present without enrolling students who 
are academically unprepared for the rigorous legal 
education that the Law School offers. 
There is accordingly no way for this Court to reverse 
the Sixth Circuit's decision without ''break[ing] ... new 
ground." U.S. Br. at 10. This Court must instead decide 
whether, consistent with Bakke, the finest law schools 
throughout the country may continue to train this Nation's 
leaders in integrated classrooms-as they have done so 
effectively for the past three decades-or whether they now 
must choose between maintaining academic distinction and 
avoiding very substantial resegregation.2 
1 Pet. App. 29a. ''Pet. App." refers to the Petition Appendix; "JA" 
refers to the Joint Appendix filed in this Court; "CAJA" refers to the 
Joint Appendix filed in the Sixth Circuit; ''Tr." refers to the transcript of 
the trial, Record 331 (Vol. 1) through Record 345 (Vol. 15). 
2 Because this Court has held that Title VI imposes substantive 
obligations coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, the decision in 
this case will bind private as well as public institutions. Pet. Br. at 20. 
Petitioner offers no basis for applying any different standards under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, and failed to preserve that argument in any event. See also 
2 
1. The Law School is among the Nation's leading law 
schools. It has achieved that preeminence by carefully 
selecting and training students of exceptional promise to 
serve as leaders of the profession and of our Nation.3 The 
Law School has determined that effective pursuit of this 
mission requires a curriculum that ''firmly links professional 
training to the opportunity for reflection about many of our 
most fundamental public questions, such as ... the effects of 
religious, racial and gender intolerance in our culture" 
(CAJA 1658), and integrated classes comprising a "mix of 
students. with varying backgrounds and experiences who 
will respect and learn from each other," each of whom is 
"among the most capable students applying to American law 
schools in a given year'' and has a "strong likelihood of 
succeeding iri the practice of law and contributing in diverse 
ways to the well-being of others." JA 110. 
Neither the petitioner nor the United States questions 
the legitimacy or importance of these goals to the Law 
School's mission. Extensive (and virtually unchallenged) 
evidence confirms that a racially diverse student body helps 
students to develop the interpersonal skills necessary to 
''work more effectively and more sensitively" in a world that 
"is and will he multi-racial" (CAJA 2243); helps to dispel 
historic stereotypes (CAJA 7697-99); and introduces 
students to unfamiliar experiences and perspectives to 
promote the ''mutual respect" and "sympathetic 
engagement with the experiences of other people that are 
basic to the mature and responsible practice of law" (CAJA 
5106). See infra pp. 21-26. The evidence also proves that 
fully realizing these benefits requires ''meaningful numbers" 
or a "critical mass" of minority students (JA 120)-enough 
to create significant opportunities for personal interaction, 
to show that there is no consistent "minority viewpoint" on 
Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1982) (declining 
to impose broader obligations under § 1981). 
3 JA 110. The Law School receives more than 3500 applications each 
year and makes approximately 1300 offers of admission to fill a class of 
around 350 students. See generally JA 156-203. 
3 
particular issues, Pet. App. 215a, and to ensure that 
"minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons 
for their race, and feel comfortable discussing issues freely 
based on their personal experiences." Id. at 28a. 
Based on the persuasive weight of the educational 
evidence, the district court emphasized that it "d[id] not 
doubt that racial diversity in the law school population" 
promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break down 
racial stereotypes, "enables [students] to better understand 
persons of different races and better equips them to serve as 
lawyers in an increasingly diverse society and an 
increasingly competitive world economy." Id. at 246a. The 
court also acknowledged that the benefits of diversity are · 
"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is 
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and 
interesting'' when the students have ''the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds." Id. at 246a, 244a. Indeed, 
petitioner acknowledged that "no one is contesting that 
there are educational benefits of diversity. It's simply not 
an issue in the case." CAJ A 7192. 
2. Petitioner and the United States nonetheless 
challenge the admissions policy that has been carefully 
crafted to achieve meaningful educational diversity. In 
1992, the Law School charged a distinguished committee of 
legal scholars to design a policy that would further its 
mission and comply with this Court's decision in Bakke. 
CAJA 7486-87, 7546-47. The policy they designed-like the 
Harvard plan it was modeled on-openly acknowledges that 
the racial background of a minority applicant can be one of 
many factors relevant to the admissions decision. JA 121. 
Petitioner's own expert conceded, however, that race is not 
the predominant factor under that policy. Tr. 2:211-13. 
Instead, its hallmark is a focus on academic capabilities 
coupled with a flexible assessment of every individual 
applicant's talents, experiences and potential ''to contribute 
to the learning of those around them." JA 111. 
First, the policy requires the director of admissions, in 
consultation with the faculty, to evaluate each applicant 
based on all of the information available in the file. JA 114-
4 
21. The Law School does not use any formulas or set 
criteria for admission. The policy requires careful 
consideration of an applicant's undergraduate grades and 
LSAT score because they are important (though imperfect) 
predictors of academic success in law school, and the 
''minimal criterion is that no applicant should be admitted 
unless we expect that applicant to do well enough to 
graduate with no serious academic problerns.',4 But "[t]here 
is no combination of grades and test scores ... below which 
an applicant will automatically be denied admission, or 
above which admission is guaranteed." Pet. App. 5a. The 
policy instead requires the admissions office to look beyond 
grades to other criteria important to the Law School's 
educational objectives, such as "experiences ... likely to be 
different from those of most students." JA 114. As Dean 
Jeffrey Lehman explained, an applicant's potential 
"contribution to the diversity of the environment" is an 
important part of his or her qualifications. Tr. 5:195. 
Second, the policy does not restrict the types of 
diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight" in 
the admissions process. J A 120. The Law School seriously 
considers each "applicant's promise of making a notable 
contribution to the class by way of a particular strength, 
attainment or characteristic-e.g., an unusual intellectual 
achievement, employment experience, nonacademic 
performance, or personal background." JA 84. The Law 
School's policy explains that effective pursuit of its 
educational mission has been greatly furthered by the 
presence of ''meaningful numbers" or a "critical mass" of 
"students from groups which have been historically 
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and Native Arnericans"5 because these students "are 
particularly likely to have experiences and perspectives of 
4 JA 111-13; Tr. 14:110-11 (Lempert). As Dean Lehman explained, 
''there is one absolute baseline criterion· upon which we will not 
compromise," and that is that "[ w ]e don't want to admit students who we 
think won't be able to make it. It's not right and it's not fair." Tr. 5:147. 
5 Members of these groups are refeITed to as "minority" students. 
5 
special importance to our mission." JA 120. But many other 
diversity-related factors are seriously considered, such as a 
record of "leadership, work experience, [and] unique talents 
or interests." Pet. App. 27a-28a; see Tr. 1:244-45. 
Third, the Law School's process ensures that candidates 
have an opportunity to share all relevant information about 
their background for consideration. The application 
requests a personal statement, letters of recommendation, 
and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will 
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School. JA 
83-84. The background and experiences revealed by the 
application "commonly" make a difference in the admissions 
decision. Tr. 1:244-45. By applying this flexible policy, the 
Law School has generally succeeded in enrolling classes of 
superb students from diverse backgrounds that include 
enough minority students to provide meaningful integration 
of its classrooms and residence halls. 
3. There is literally no chance that these results could 
be sustained under any race-blind admissions program. In 
1997 when petitioner applied, there were only 67 minority 
applicants, compared to 1236 white and Asian American 
applicants, in the LSAT range (164+) from which over 90% 
of the admitted white students were drawn. J A 172-79. 
Competition for these minority applicants is extremely 
fierce, and the Law School cannot hope to enroll more than a 
few of them. In 2000, there were only 26 African-American 
applicants nationwide with at least a 3.5 GP A and a 165 on 
the LSAT compared to 3173 whites and Asian Americans.6 
Any race-blind methodology applied to the upper and 
middle grade and test score ranges will therefore invariably 
select a class with very few minority students. 
6 And there were only 170 African-Americans with at least a 3.0 GPA 
and 160 LSAT, compared to 11,348 whites and Asian Americans. Law 
School Admissions Council, National Statistical Report, 1995-96 through 
1999-00 (2001) (lodged with the Court by LSAC). Because the United 
States has relied on data outside the record to support its assertion that 
race-neutral alternatives are available, we reference some responsive 
information appropriate for judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. , 
6 
Although the district court did not designate the issue 
of race-neutral alternatives for trial (CAJA 99), it found "no 
reason to doubt" that the number of minority students 
would drop "sharply and dramatically'' under a "race-blind 
admission system" that continues to give substantial weight 
to grades and LSAT scores. Pet. App. 229a. An unrebutted 
expert study demonstrated that a class of 400 students 
selected that way would have included a total of 16 African-
American, Hispanic and Native American students-down 
from 58 under the Law School's policy. CAJA 6047. The 
educational benefits that depend upon opportunities for 
frequent interaction among students of different races 
cannot be achieved with so few minority enrollments.7 
The district court nevertheless faulted the Law School 
for its "failure to consider" and "perhaps experiment" with 
race-neutral programs that would sacrifice academic 
excellence and selectivity-such as the random selection of 
applications that satisfy minimum quantitative credentials 
through a ''l()ttery.',s Pet. App. 251a. The Sixth Circuit 
7 The study demonstrated the impact of a race-blind policy on typical 
learning environments. With a hypothetical 58 minority students, there is 
a 76% chance that a first-year small section of about 43 students will have 
more than one or two African-American students and more than one or 
two Hispanic students. With only 16 minority students, the probability is 
4%. The chance of having such modest, concrete diversity in a residential 
dormitory section would fall from 34% to 1 %. The probability of a student 
being the only African-American in a small section would increase from 
4% to 51 %; and in a dormitory section from 18% to 69%. CAJA 6045-49. 
8 Petitioner's year 2000 grids, JA 196-203, show that even a race-blind 
lottery for every applicant scoring above 150 (50th percentile) on the 
LSAT would have offered admission to about 15 African-American, 16 
Hispanic, and 3 Native American applicants-a 79% decline. By 
preventing the Law School from accepting students with truly 
exceptional academic qualifications at a higher rate than those with less 
impressive credentials, a lottery would also seriously undermine its other 
educational goals. (The number of offers extended to applicants scoring 
170 or over on the LSAT would, for example, fall by 88%.) Moreover, 
even these bleak results could not be sustained once it became known that 
the Law School was conducting such a lottery, because the pool would 
immediately be flooded with applications from lower-scoring white 
students who do not currently apply, CAJA 7902-03 (Orfield), and 
7 
rejected that reasoning. It held that "Bakke and the 
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions [do not] require the 
Law School to choose between meaningful racial and ethnic 
diversity and academic selectivity." Id. at 35a. Petitioner 
suggests that the Sixth Circuit's decision should be reversed 
because it applied de novo review to this and several other 
issues, but the courts below clearly disagreed only as to 
matters oflaw and legal characterization, not historical fact.9 
4. The district court similarly made no factual finding 
that the Law School was administering a secret quota 
forbidden by this Court's decision in Bakke. See Pet. Br. at 
41-42; U.S. Br. at 9. To the contrary, it acknowledged that 
''the law school has not set aside a fixed number of seats for 
underrepresented minority students, as did the medical 
school in Bakke." Pet. App. 248a. The district court did 
reason that the admissions policy should be characterized as 
the functional equivalent of a quota because the ''practical 
effect" of the policy has been to admit more than 10% 
minorities each year. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected that 
legal conclusion, however, observing that the Harvard plan 
also pursued "meaningful numbers of minority students" but 
that did not make it a quota. Id. at 27a-28a. 
Indeed, the record confirms that the faculty members 
who drafted the admissions policy in 1991 took precautions 
to ensure that the policy would not be read to authorize, 
require, or encourage admissions officers to admit a 
predetermined number of minority applicants. An early 
draft of the policy expressly stated that the Law School was 
likely to obtain the benefits of a critical mass when minority 
enrollment ranged between 11 and 17%. Pet. App. 225a. 
The chair of the Committee responsible for developing the 
policy explained that this range was derived from the 
educational experience of the faculty in prior years. CAJ A 
7564-65. Although one member of the Committee advocated 
that this numerical range should be retained in the final 
abandoned by high-scoring students-who place great weight on 
academic selectivity, and the national rankings driven by it. 
9 See infra pp. 33 n.51, 41 n.69. 
8 
policy because they were "just guidelines" and therefore 
"permissible under Bakke," the Committee rejected that 
suggestion in order to avoid ''the risk that exists when you 
put numbers in, even as a guideline," that a future 
admissions officer might "see these numbers" and feel bound 
by them. CAJA 7736 (Lehman).10 
Nor is there any evidence that the Law School officials 
violated the intent of this policy by secretly directing the 
admission of a predetermined number of minority 
applicants. Dean Lehman and other Law School officials 
who administer the policy testified categorically that they 
did not employ any numerical quota in assembling the 
class.11 And the district court determined that they "acted 
reasonably and in good faith in adopting and administering 
the policy'' in an "attempt□ to comply with Bakke" (Pet. 
App. 254a, 253a)-a finding that cannot be reconciled with 
any notion that they devised "disguised quotas." U.S. Br. at 
9. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of minority students 
in each class varied from 42 to 73 (13.5-20.1%)-a range 
inconsistent with the operation of a fixed quota. JA 156-203; 
CAJA 1536, 4929-96, 5387-93, 5463-69; Pet. App. 30a. 
Dean Lehman also testified without contradiction that 
enrolling a critical mass of minority students is merely one 
"value in [the] composition of the student body that is 
important to us pedagogically" but ''not the only value." 
CAJA 7767-68. That goal is balanced against competing 
objectives, such as assembling a class that shows 
10 Petitioner asserts that the 1992 policy merely ''ratif[ied]" a previous 
policy that included a goal of 10 to 12% minorities. Pet. Br. at 3-4. 
Although the 1992 policy was intended to "ratify [the Law School's] 
attention in the past to race for purposes of establishing a diverse law 
school class," CAJA 7533 (Lempert), the policy "represent[ed] a major 
change" in the way applications were processed, id. at 7504. The mission 
of the Committee was to "rewrite, rethink, [and] redo the admissions 
policy'' in order to ensure that ''the policy was ... constitutional" under 
Bakke. Id. at 7492; see also Tr. 3:70 (Bollinger). 
11 Pet. App. 26a; CAJA 7749-50 (Lehman), 7313 (Munzel), 7667, 7693 
(Shields); Tr. 3:64 (Bollinger). 
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exceptional academic promise and is broadly diverse in 
attributes other than race. Id. at 7251-54, 7521-26. 
5. Petitioner also asks this Court to find that the "plus 
factor" afforded to some minority applicants was just too 
large. But the district court did not find that the Law 
School could have admitted meaningful numbers of minority 
applicants if it had assigned less weight to these applicants' 
contributions to racial diversity; or that the acknowledged 
educational benefits could have been achieved with fewer 
minority students; or that the plus factor was so large that 
the minority students were not well qualified for the rigors 
of the Law School's demanding academic program. 
Although the court found that the median undergraduate 
GP A of every underrepresented minority group "has been 
lower than the median GP A of Caucasians by approximately 
one-tenth to three-tenths of a point" between 1995 and 2000, 
and that the median LSAT has been approximately "seven 
to nine points" lower,12 it never questioned (and petitioner 
stipulated) that all of the applicants adrnitted under the Law 
School's . policy were qualified. CAJA 8785. The Law 
School's minority students have grades and scores which-
while not always as exceptional as many white and Asian 
American admittees-nonetheless are superior to most 
applicants nationwide. They graduate, pass the bar exam, 
obtain judicial clerkships, and succeed in the practice of law 
at rates essentially indistinguishable from their white and 
Asian American classmates. Id. at 6222-23, 6243-58, 5870-81. 
Petitioner nevertheless relies upon certain disparities 
in numerical credentials reflected in her admissions "grids" 
as proof that the program is not narrowly tailored to achieve 
its educational goals. Pet. Br. at 5-10. These grids were 
12 Pet. App. 275a-76a. These disparities significantly overstate the size 
of the Law School's ''plus factor." As a vertical line drawn anywhere on 
the graph at JA 219 will illustrate, there would be large differences in 
average test scores between admitted white and minority students even 
if the process were entirely race-blind-because most of the minority 
students would still be in the bottom half of the pool. See Bowen & Bok, 
Shape of the River 29, 42 (2000) (demonstrating that race-blind admissions 
would eliminate only 14% of the test score gap at selective universities). 
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generated by her statistician. It is undisputed that the Law 
School used nothing of the kind in its actual admissions 
process.13 They do, however, illustrate two key points. 
First, the grids reveal that an applicant's college GP A, 
LSAT score, and ethnic background all influence admissions 
decisions, but even together those factors fail to explain the 
outcomes-either within or across racial categories. More 
than 40% of the admitted white and Asian American 
applicants from 1995 to 2000 came from "cells" in which at 
least 30% of the total white and Asian American applicants 
were rejected, demonstrating that subjective factors make 
the difference between acceptance and rejection for a great 
many of them as well. 
And those factors can be given substantial weight. 
Even crediting the district court's suggestion that diversity 
considerations might outweigh differences of up to a third of 
a letter grade or 7-9 points on the LSAT for minority 
students, the record shows that white and Asian American 
applicants frequently receive similar credit for other 
diversity factors. Holding GPA constant at 3.5-3.74, 53 
white or Asian American students were accepted between 
1995 and 2000 with an LSAT of 160 or below, whereas 88 
with an LSAT of 167 or above were rejected. Holding· 
LSAT constant at 164-166, 189 white or Asian American 
applicants with a 3.49 GP A or lower were accepted over 283 
with a 3.75 or better.14 Non-minority applicants are also 
frequently accepted with grades and test scores lower than 
minority applicants who are rejected. Sixty-nine minority 
applicants were rejected between 1995 and 2000 with at 
least a 3.5 GPA and a 159 or higher on the LSAT, while 85 
white and Asian American applicants were accepted from 
the same or lower cells.15 These observations do not suggest 
13 CAJA 7289-90, 7687-88; Tr. 5:139-42. 
14 These numbers would be significantly higher but for the fact that the 
Law School naturally finds quite substantial diversity in a variety of 
attributes within the large pool of white and Asian American applicants 
with the highest academic credentials. JA 121-22. 
15 See generally JA 156-203. Note that petitioner's "Selected Minority" 
grids exclude "Other Hispanic" applicants-all of whom are properly 
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that race does not matter in the admissions process. The · 
grids demonstrate, however, that the Law School considers 
race only in the context of an individualized review seriously 
weighing many factors, including subjective non-racial 
diversity factors that make a real and dispositive difference 
for many white and Asian American applicants as well. 
Second, the Law School's individualized consideration of 
racial background does not actually affect the outcome of the 
overwhelming majority of the admissions decisions each 
year, or unfairly burden other applicants who may have 
higher test scores but who would not significantly enhance 
the diversity of the class. Plaintiff's own expert testified 
that he was "sure" that grades and test scores had the 
"strongest association with admissions decisions" relative to 
any other factors, including race. Tr. 2:211-13. 
Approximately two-thirds of the Law School's minority 
applicants are denied admission each year, and in each of the 
years between 1995 and 2000 the Law School denied 
admission to a greater proportion of minority applicants 
than majority applicants. CAJA 6045, 7585. Nor is there 
any dispute that the average odds of admission for non-
minority applicants would have increased by less than 5% if 
the Law School had not taken race into account as part of its 
assessment of diversity contributions. Id. at 6045. 
Accordingly, petitioner's "probabilities" and "odds 
ratios" comparing white and minority applicants with 
identical credentials (Pet. Br. at 8-10) would reveal nothing 
unlawful even if the methodology were sound. See infra 
p. 44. It would be surprising indeed, in a regime in which 
race is given any weight, if minority applicants were not 
admitted at substantially higher rates than otherwise 
similar non-minority applicants. As the Sixth Circuit 
included among the category described as Hispanic in the Law School 
policy. CAJA 321, 477; see also, e.g., CAJA 7311 (confirming that some 
minorities are rejected even though whites with lower quantitative 
credentials are accepted) (Munzel); JA 182-83 (white applicant in 1998 in 
LSAT 151-53/GPA 2.75-2.99 "cell" admitted while all five African-
American applicants in the same cell were rejected). 
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explained, petitioners have "concede[d] that all admitted 
students are qualified," and evidence that race ''plays an 
important role in some admissions decisions" is simply the 
''logical result of reliance on the Harvard Plan." Pet. App. 
31a (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Twenty-five years ago, this Court resolved a bitter 
national controversy over the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions policies in its landmark decision in 
Bakke. The essential holding of Bakke is that quotas and 
set-asides are illegal, but that some attention may be paid to 
race in the context of a competitive review of the ways that 
each applicant will contribute to the overall diversity of the 
student body. As the Sixth Circuit properly held, the Law 
School's admissions practices are "virtually 
indistinguishable" from the Harvard College policy 
specifically endorsed by five Justices in Bakke. Pet. App. 
29a. Petitioner therefore cannot prevail unless the square 
holding of Bakke is overruled, expressly or sub silentio. 
No persuasive justification exists for making such a 
radical and disruptive break with settled precedent. Bakke 
has been relied upon by universities for decades with the 
express authorization of the Department of Education, and 
has become an important part of our national culture. It is 
also clearly correct. Despite noble aspirations and 
considerable progress, our society remains deeply troubled 
by issues of race. Against that backdrop, there are 
important educational benefits-for students and for the 
wider society-associated with a diverse, racially integrated 
student body. Indeed, petitioner does not disagree. In the 
face of overwhelming educational and social science 
evidence presented by the Law School, she conceded the 
point in the district court. 
The Law School's admissions policy is cautious, limited, 
and narrowly tailored to the pursuit of that compelling 
educational goal. The heart of that policy is an individualized 
review of the many different ways that each applicant might 
contribute to the learning environment at the Law School, 
and to the legal profession and our Nation after graduation. 
13 
Because the educational benefits of a diverse student body 
depend on opportunities for interaction among students, the 
Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a "critical mass" 
of minority students. Its experience has been that a critical 
mass helps to foster more genuine interaction among 
students of different racial backgrounds. But that goal is 
constantly balanced against the Law School's other 
educational objectives, such as assembling a class that is 
both exceptionally academically qualified and· broadly 
diverse in ways other than race. The Law School does not 
employ quotas or set-asides, and race is by no means the 
predominant factor in its admissions program. 
There are no viable race-neutral alternatives at this 
time. The Law School firmly believes that high academic 
standards and a diverse student body are both integral to 
effective pursuit of its chosen educational mission. It is 
fortunate to receive enough applications from talented, well-
qualified minority students to avoid both the Scylla of 
resegregation and the Charybdis of enrolling students 
unprepared for the education that it offers. Given the 
national population of college graduates, however, law 
schools like Michigan cannot admit those students in 
meaningful numbers without paying some attention to race. 
This dilemma is shared by every highly selective law 
school in the United States, public and private. It is not an 
exaggeration, therefore, to say that a decision by this Court 
overruling Bakke would force most of this Nation's finest 
institutions to choose between dramatic resegregation and 
completely abandoning the demanding standards that have 
made American higher education the envy of the world. The 
United States understands the nature of that choice, yet 
pretends that the Law School could magically resolve it by 
"easing admissions requirements for all students." U.S. Br. 
at 14. That is a fantasy. No honestly colorblind alternative 
could produce educationally meaningful racial diversity at 
present without substantially abandoning reliance on 
traditional academic criteria, and · hence abandoning 
academic excellence as well. The Law School, having 
struggled for more than a century to build a great 
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institution dedicated to excellence in the advancement of 
human knowledge, will not willingly do that. But neither 
does it relish the prospect of trying to educate the next 
generation of leaders for the legal profession and our Nation 
in a segregated enclave, "in isolation from the individuals 
and institutions with which the law interacts." Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW SCHOOL HAS A COMPELLING 
INTEREST IN THE LIMITED, COMPETITIVE 
CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS 
TO SECURE THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS 
THAT FLOW FROM STUDENT BODY 
DIVERSITY 
A. This Court Held In Bakke That Institutions Of 
Higher Education May Consider The Race Of 
Applicants AB One Factor Among Many When 
Attempting To Assemble A Diverse, Racially 
Integrated Student Body 
Although different Justices articulated a range of views 
about the permissibility of race-conscious admissions 
practices in Bakke, Justice Powell forged a middle ground 
that constituted {and has ever since been relied on as) the 
holding of the case. Joining Justice Powell, a majority of 
this Court agreed on several important propositions-all of 
which were essential to the result. Five Justices reversed 
the California Supreme Court's mandate prohibiting the 
University of California from considering race in admissions 
decisions, 438 U.S. at 270 n.**, 271, agreeing that the 
"competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin" in the 
context of a ''properly devised admissions program" would 
be constitutional and consistent with Title VI, id. at 320. 
Five Justices agreed that the University of California could 
constitutionally devise such a program even though it was 
"conceded that [the University] had no history of 
discrimination" and the University articulated no narrowly 
remedial justification for considering race. Id. at 296 n.36 
(Powell, J.). And all five agreed that Harvard College's 
admissions policy-which also articulated no remedial 
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purpose and was solely tailored toward, and justified by, 
Harvard's desire to assemble a diverse student body-was 
"properly devised" and "constitutional." Id. at 320, 326 n.1 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
The minimum core or essential holding of Bakke, 
therefore, is that a University may consider race in 
admissions, even if it has no historical discrimination of its 
own to remedy, at least in the manner exemplified by the 
Harvard plan appended to Justice Powell's opinion. These 
observations require no sophisticated analysis, and they 
alone are sufficient to support the Sixth Circuit's judgment 
in this case-since as that court held the Law School's policy 
is "virtually indistinguishable" from the Harvard plan. 
Petitioner nevertheless asserts (Pet. Br. at 27-28) that 
the holding in Part V-C of Bakke has no precedential force 
here because it says nothing about the permissible purposes 
of a "competitive" race-conscious plan. Although the broad 
language of Part V-C certainly leaves a great deal 
unspecified, that paragraph was not the only proposition to 
garner a majority. Five Justices also specifically agreed 
that the Harvard admissions policy was constitutional. 
Because the sole justification advanced in that plan was 
student body diversity, it necessarily follows that five 
Justices agreed that diversity was a sufficient justification. 
Petitioners resist that obvious conclusion based on the fact 
that Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun 
"agree[d] with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan like the 
'Harvard' plan ... is constitutional under [their] approach, at 
least so long as the use of race to achwve an integrated 
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past 
discrimination." 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J. concurring 
in part) (emphasis added). But the italicized language in 
Justice Brennan's opinion means only that a policy like 
Harvard's must cease considering race once the disparities 
in applicants' numerical qualifications produced by our 
Nation's discriminatory past have been eliminated, because 
a racially diverse class could then be assembled by other 
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means. The Law School agrees with that caveat, and Justice 
Powell plainly did too; sadly, that day has not yet arrived.16 
Justice Powell's reasoning was also the "narrowest 
ground" articulated by any of the Justices supporting 
reversal, and is therefore a holding of this Court under 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). It is 
possible to tie oneself in metaphysical knots when applying 
Marks, by postulating creative and endlessly different 
theoretical axes along which one opinion or another might 
be considered the most ''narrow." But Justice Powell's 
opinion was "narrowest" in every sense that mattered: it 
completely defined, as a practical matter, the universe of 
race-conscious admissions programs that a majority of this 
Court regarded as constitutional.17 It was immediately 
obvious to courts, 18 commentators19 and countless public 
16 Justice Brennan and his colleagues did not mean that Harvard's 
admissions practices were constitutional only if justified by a remedial 
purpose. The language they chose ("so long as ... necessitated by" rather 
than ''if ... justified by") makes that clear. See Pet. App.18a & n.7, 19a & 
n.8. It also would have made no sense. Harvard's policy was forthrightly 
non-remedial in motivation, 438 U.S. at 321-22, and therefore (for reasons 
ably explained by petitioners themselves (Pet. Br. at 35)) it could not have 
been rendered constitutional by an unarticulated remedial rationale. 
17 The other Justices forming that majority believed that the 
Constitution permits much more extensive and varied consideration of 
race in admissions; indeed, they voted to affirm the rigid 16-seat quota 
employed by UC-Davis. In other words, those Justices had much broader 
reasons for reversing the California Supreme Court because they 
believed it improperly foreclosed a wider spectrum of legal conduct than 
Justice Powell did. See City of Richrrwnd v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 496-97 (1989) (noting that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke would 
permit consideration of race only to pursue narrowly "focused" objectives, 
not the "amorphous" goal of remedying societal discrimination). 
18 The State and federal courts have widely regarded Justice Powell's 
opinion in Bakke as the controlling law. See, e.g., Univ. & Cmty. Coll. 
Sys. of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997); McDonal,d v. Hogness, 
598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981); 
UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Martin v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1979), afj'd, 626 
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officials and institutions after Bakke that Justice Powell's 
analysis and the Harvard plan were the coherent, if narrow, 
common ground for this Court's judgment-and therefore 
the law of the land.20 As the U.S. Department of Education 
announced to the higher education community, "[t]he Court 
affirmed the legality of voluntary affirmative action" in 
order to "attain a diverse student body." 21 
B. Settled Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly 
Counsel Against Overruling Bakke 
Because Bakke has proven to be a landmark decision, 
the principles outlined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), provide a useful 
framework for analyzing whether there is any "'special 
justification",22 for reconsidering that decision. There is not. 
F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit's contrary decision nearly 
twenty years later in HO'f)'Wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), has 
gained few adherents. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 
F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). 
19 See, e.g., Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get 
Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.", 1979 Wash U. L. 
Q. 147, 148 (describing Powell's opinion as "the law of the land"); Blasi, 
Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 Cal. L. 
Rev. 21, 30 (1979) (''The Powell opinion is, after all, the key to assessing 
the precedential significance of the Bakke decision."); Dixon, Bakke: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 69, 69 (1979) ("The actual 'ruling' 
in Bakke, stemming only from Justice Powell's tiebreaking opinion, that 
race may be a factor but not the factor in the admissions criteria ... has 
acquired wide pragmatic appeal."). 
20 Petitioner cites Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), in which 
this Court elected to forego Marks analysis altogether and overrule 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), on the merits. Pet. Br. at 28-29. 
Bakke has not produced anything like the confusion that followed 
Baldasar. In any event, this Court could take that tack in Nichols only 
because it was resolved to overrule Baldasar either way. A similar 
approach here would require this Court to assume for purposes of 
decision that Bakke produced a binding holding, and then consider 
whether to overrule it under traditional principles of stare decisis. 
21 44 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 58,510 (Oct. 10, 1979). 
2'l Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995) (quoting 
Ariz. v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,212 (1984)). 
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First, intervening decisions of this Court have not left 
Bakke "a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society." Id. 
at 855. This Court has never questioned the core holding of 
Bakke, and indeed has uniformly assumed its continuing 
validity.23 Bakke has become a ''long-established precedent 
... integrated into the fabric of the law," Adarand, 515 U.S. 
at 233, and of our ''national culture," Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
Second, the standards established in Bakke have 
proven to be "[]workable," Casey, 505 U.S. at 855, as 
demonstrated by a 23-year history of enforcement under 
Department of Education regulations. Shortly after Bakke, 
the Department undertook a comprehensive reexamination 
of its regulations governing higher education admissions 
under Title VI. It concluded that universities could, 
"consistent with Bakke and the Department's regulation, ... 
[c]onsider race, color, or national origin as a positive factor, 
with other factors ... in selecting from among qualified 
candidates," and that "[t]he relative weight granted to each 
factor is properly determined by institution officials; race, 
color or national origin may be accorded greater weight than 
other factors." 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,510. The Department has 
reaffirmed its regulations and guidance many times over the 
past two decades and :five presidential administrations, and 
has used the standards established in Bakke as an effective, 
workable framework for the enforcement of Title VI in both 
23 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-19, 224-25 (describing adoption of 
intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 
(1990), as a "surprising turn" from the use of strict scrutiny in decisions 
such as Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267,286,288 n* (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) 
(recognizing that this Court's affirmative action cases reveal a ''fair 
measure of consensus," including that ''the promotion of racial diversity 
has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher 
education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that 
interest"); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 568; id. at 619, 621, 625 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) 
(upholding gender-based affirmative action policy, and drawing a 
favorable analogy to the Harvard plan). 
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admissions and financial aid.24 Although the United States 
remarkably fails to mention its regulations or policy 
interpretations in its brief, all of them remain in force and 
none would be constitutional if Bakke is overruled.25 
Third, Bakke could not be overruled ''without serious 
inequity to those who have relied upon it." Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 855. Over the past twenty-five years, universities and 
professional schools, public and private, have made 
countless decisions about their faculty hiring, physical plant, 
capital spending and curriculum in reliance on this Court's 
assurance that they would not be forced to a stark choice 
between racial diversity and radically lower academic 
standards and ambitions. The State legislators and private 
donors who fund these institutions have chosen to support 
them instead of countless other worthy causes because, in 
part, they are both racially integrated and committed to 
academic excellence.26 If Bakke is overruled, the Law 
School will have to become a very different kind of 
institution than it, its philanthropic donors, and the State of 
Michigan have worked so hard to build. 
Finally, overruling Bakke would cause "significant 
damage to the stability of the society governed by it." 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. Overruling Bakke would force this 
Nation's elite and selective institutions of higher education, 
public and private, to an immediate choice between dramatic 
24 See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (Dec. IO, 1991) (applying Bakke to 
financial aid); 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994) (same); see also CAJA 787 
(Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae). 
25 The race-conscious admissions policies employed by the United States 
at its own universities, the military academies, would also be 
unconstitutional under petitioner's reasoning. See Brief for Lt. Gen. 
Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amicus Curiae. 
26 State legislatures must, for example, constantly choose between 
distributing limited resources evenly across an array of relatively non-
selective institutions designed to bring the benefits of higher education to 
the greatest number of citizens, or disproportionately funding a selective 
flagship research institution. States like California, Michigan, North 
Carolina and Virginia that have historically chosen the latter course 
might reasonably conclude that they can no longer justify it if the flagship 
institution can no longer admit a significant number of minority students. 
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resegregation and abandoning academic selectivity. If they 
chose to maintain academic standards, the representation of 
African-American students at the 89 most selective law 
schools would fall from approximately 7% now to less than 
1 %. Three-quarters of the African-American students who 
are currently admitted to accredited law schools would not 
be accepted anywhere, and 40% of those still admitted would 
be admitted only to schools with predominantly minority 
student populations.27 Those predictions are confirmed by 
experience. In the year after the Fifth Circuit prohibited 
the University of Texas Law School from considering race 
in its admissions process, for example, Hispanic admissions 
fell by 33% and African-American admissions fell by 86%-
to four students, out of a class of about 500.28 
As the United States recognizes (U.S. Br. at 16), if 
higher education is not "broadly inclusive to our diverse 
national community, then the top jobs, graduate schools and 
the professions will be closed to some." Yet a decision to 
overrule Bakke would cut the minority lawyers currently 
being trained by half or three-quarters, resulting in the 
near-complete absence of minority students from the schools 
that train most of our federal judges, prosecutors and law 
clerks (to say nothing of the new lawyers at our country's 
leading law firrns).29 That is a chilling prospect. As our 
country becomes increasingly racially diverse, the public 
confidence in law enforcement and legal institutions so 
essential to the coherence and stability of our society will be 
27 See Wightman, The Threat to Di,versity in Legal Education: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor 
in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (1997); 
CA.TA 2254-56 (Bok) (discussing Wightman's findings). 
28 JA 209. Texas has increased these numbers marginally in recent 
years, but has not achieved meaningful diversity. And the strategies it 
employs are neither race-neutral nor a realistic option for the Law School. 
See, e.g., Brief for American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae. 
29 Nearly 600 of this Court's 824 judicial clerks since 1980 were 
graduates of just six of these law schools (including the Law School). 
There would be serious negative consequences at the state government 
level as well. See Brief for Arizona State University College of Law. 
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difficult to maintain if the segments of the bench and bar 
currently filled by graduates of those institutions again 
become a preserve for white graduates, trained in isolation 
from the communities they will serve. 
C. Educational Experience, Social Science 
Research, And Common Sense Confirm That 
Diversity Has Compelling Educational Benefits 
This Court recognized long before Bakke that preparing 
students for work and citizenship in our diverse society is 
exceedingly difficult in racially homogenous classrooms and 
on racially segregated campuses. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629, 634 (1950), this Court held that Heman Sweatt 
could not receive an equal legal education at a law school 
which "excludes from its student body members of the racial 
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and 
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and 
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be 
dealing." Id. "The law school, the proving ground for legal 
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from 
the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts." Id. This Court has aclmowledged the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body repeatedly 
since then. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 
& n.11 (1954); Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 
472 (1982) ("[I]t should be equally clear that white as well as 
Negro children benefit from exposure to 'ethnic and racial 
diversity in the classroom."') (citation omitted). And those 
conclusions have been confirmed by congressional findings, 
educational experience, social science, and common sense. 
1. Congress has repeatedly made specific findings that 
"elimination of racial isolation has significant educational 
benefits," even in the absence of any prior discrimination or 
remedial purpose, when authorizing federal financial 
assistance for local school districts seeking to eliminate both 
de jure and merely de facto segregation in their schools.30 
30 See Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 701-720, 86 
Stat. 354 (1972); Magnet Schools Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 
§§ 701-712, 98 Stat. 1299 (1984). 
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The legislative history reveals Congress's firm conclusion 
that "racially integrated education improves the quality of 
education for all children," H.R. Rep. No. 92-576, at 10 
(1971), and that "[e]ducation in an integrated environment, 
in which children are exposed to diverse backgrounds, is 
beneficial to both" white and minority students, S. Rep. No. 
92-61, at 7 (1971). The recently enacted No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 reaffirmed Congress's findings that "[i]t 
is in the best interests of the United States ... to continue 
the Federal Government's support of local educational 
agencies that are ... voluntarily seeking to foster meaningful 
interaction among students of different racial and ethnic 
backgrounds .... "31 
2. These findings, which reflect the longstanding 
conviction of the United States government on a set of 
critically important issues of fact and national policy, were 
also supported by a powerful and essentially uncontested 
evidentiary record in this case.32 The United States filed an 
amicus curiae brief in the district court summarizing the 
social science research, and concluding that diversity "in the 
higher education context improves students' education, 
racial understanding, cultural awareness, cognitive 
development and leadership skills." CAJ A 803. In its filing 
in this Court, the United States repeatedly emphasized its 
belief that educational diversity is an "important goal[],'' 
U.S. Br. at 8, and that keeping undergraduate and graduate 
institutions open to ''people of all races and ethnicities" is "a 
paramount government objective." Id. at 13. 
That belief does not depend on "crude stereotypes." Pet. 
Br. at 38. It simply acknowledges the elephant in the 
room-that despite the recent advent of formal equality 
under the law and indisputable progress in race relations (in 
part because of the growing racial diversity in institutions 
31 Pub. L. No. 107~110, § 5301(a)(4)(A), 115 Stat. 1425, 1806 (2002) 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7231). 
32 See generally, e.g., CAJA 2240-709 (expert reports), 5617-23 and 5641-
42 (Syverud reports), 7515-18 (Lempert testimony), 7699-706 (Syverud 
testimony), 7749 (Lehman testimony). 
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like the Law School), America remains both highly 
segregated by race and profoundly and constantly aware of 
its significance in our society. Many white Americans 
underestimate those realities because, of course, "[t]o be 
born white is to be free from confronting one's race on a 
daily, personal, interaction-by-interaction basis." By 
contrast, "[t]o be born black is to know an unchangeable fact 
about oneself that matters every day."33 The evidence for 
that fact, anecdotal and scientific, is beyond serious dispute. 
The House Judiciary Committee recently found that: 
millions of African-Americans and Hispanics alter 
their driving habits in ways that would never occur 
to most white Americans. Some completely avoid 
places like all-white suburbs, where they fear police 
harassment for looking "out of place." Some 
intentionally drive only bland cars or change the way 
they dress. Others who drive long distances even 
factor in extra time for the traffic stops that seem 
inevitable.34 
African-American men are asked to pay almost twice the 
markup that white men are asked to pay for automobiles.35 
Recent studies have shown dramatic disparities in the 
treatment of whites and African-Americans trying to rent an 
apartment over the telephone (most people can identify a 
caller's race by dialect and the sound of their voice).36 
The issue is much more complex and subtle than just the 
unfortunate persistence of widespread racial discrimination. 
33 Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060, 
1066 (1991). 
34 House Judiciary Committee, Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 
2000, H.R. Rep. No. 106-517, at 3-4 (2000); see also id. at 4-5 (noting that 
in some jurisdictions African-American drivers are five to twenty-one 
times more likely to be subject to traffic stops than are white drivers). 
35 Ayres & Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining 
for a New Car, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 304, 313 (June 1995). 
36 See, e.g., Baugh, Racial Identification by Speech, 75 Am. Speech 362-
64 (2000); Massey & Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial 
Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings, 
36 Urban Affairs Rev. 452,461 (Mar. 2001). 
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Stereotypes and unthinking assumptions about social roles 
pervasively influence daily life. The Dean of the School of 
Education at Berkeley, who is Hispanic, testified in this case 
that when he was cutting the grass in front of his own house, 
a neighbor approached him to ask what he charges for yard 
work. CAJA 8472. And the renowned historian John Hope 
Franklin testified that "in recent years he has been 
approached more than once by a white person in a hotel 
lobby or private club who asked him to fetch her coat or car." 
Pet. App. 267a. 
Minority students draw as wide a range of conclusions 
from experiences like these, and from the ideas they have 
been exposed to, as white students do from their own lives 
and influences. The Law School's minority students are, like 
its white students, liberals and conservatives, 
communitarians and libertarians, devotees of both Mill and 
Kant. But the presence of persons who have had such 
experiences enriches the educational environment, if only 
because it is human nature to undervalue or fail to see 
burdens that we haven't truly experienced ourselves. 37 
3. The importance of these differences in lived 
experience is particularly trenchant in the context of legal 
education. The legal system is the epicenter of our Nation's 
ongoing struggle to overcome racial divisions that persist in 
our society. Indeed, monitoring and mediating the progress 
of that struggle has become one of the most important jobs 
of the federal courts. Discrimination suits under Titles VI, 
37 These lessons cannot be learned from books, or by lecture in a racially 
homogenous classroom. Dean Syverud testified that "the best active, 
Socratic teaching'' provokes "direct and often painful dialogue between 
students who are forced by the method to confront and make explicit 
their deepest unexamined convictions about legal issues." CAJA 5619. 
As Dean Lehman explained, that classroom dynamic does not "work□ 
really, really well" unless its participants are "drawing on a broad range 
of backgrounds and experiences which are personal." Id. at 7747. Dean 
Syverud testified that racial heterogeneity improves the classroom 
dynamic even in classes ''far removed from issues traditionally associated 
with race" such as insurance, id. at 5622, and that he has been unable to 
"recreate the dynamic of a diverse Socratic classroom" in racially 
homogenous classes. Id. at 7710-11. 
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VII and IX, ongoing school desegregation cases, Voting 
Rights Act enforcement and racial-profiling lawsuits have 
all become staples of the case load. What legal consequences 
if any should follow from the disparate impact of the 
criminal justice system in general, and certain criminal 
statutes in particular, on racial minorities is one of the most 
oft-debated and important challenges that our society faces. 
Against this backdrop, law schools need the autonomy 
and discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race 
in our society and legal system, and preparing their 
students to function effectively as leaders after graduation, 
are critically important aspects of their institutional 
m1ss10ns. And it hardly requires extensive proof that 
pursuit of those goals is greatly enhanced by the presence of 
meaningful racial diversity among the law school's student 
body-enhanced in ways that white students alone, no 
matter what their viewpoints are or even what their 
experiences have been, cannot possibly supply. 
The presence of minority students is also essential to the 
Law School's educational mission in other ways. At its most 
successful, the educational process is a productive collision 
not only of facts and ideas, but also of people. The Law 
School is training lawyers and leaders for a society in which, 
within the careers of its current students, white citizens will 
become a minority of the population. Those students need 
to learn how to bridge racial divides, work sensitively and 
effectively with people of different races, and simply 
overcome the initial discomfort of interacting with people 
visibly different from themselves that is a hallmark of 
human nature.38 As then-Provost Condoleezza Rice recently 
explained, "differences in talent, in background, in racial and 
ethnic identity, in creed" in an educational environment can 
open "a small window on perhaps the greatest challenge 
38 See CAJA 7909 (Or.field), 310, 2243, 5044, 5106. Dean Lehman 
testified that "there are significant numbers of Michigan students who 
come to the law school with very little prior contact with people of other 
races." Tr. 5:158; see also Tr. 6:116 (Orfield) (half of Michigan students 
have no or very little interracial contact prior to Law School). 
26 
before us as human beings-finding a way that people who 
are different can live together in peace and move forward 
together." Stanford Class Day Speech (June 12, 1999).39 
4. Effective pursuit of these goals requires more than 
an isolated handful of minority students, for several reasons. 
First, the educational benefits of diversity depend on 
opportunities for interaction-in classrooms, cafeterias, or 
residential settings. The Law School is a large institution, 
and a few minority students obviously could not be 
everywhere at once, or establish meaningful personal ties 
with more than a small fraction of their classmates. 
Second, the presence of more than one or two minority 
students in a classroom encourages students to think 
critically and reexamine stereotypes. Kent Syverud, Dean 
of the Vanderbilt Law School, testified that the classroom 
"dynamic is different within the class among the students 
and between me and the students, when the class is 
homogenous" or has a "token minority student" than "when 
there are enough minority students ... that there is a 
diversity of views and experiences among the minority 
students." CA.TA 7698; id. at 5618-20. When there are more 
than a token number of minority students, "everybody in 
the class starts looking at people as individuals in their 
views and experiences, instead of as races/' Id. at 7699. 
Third, as the Harvard plan recognized, there is a 
powerful body of evidence that very low numbers of 
minority students tend to create a "sense of isolation among 
the [minority] students themselves" that would "make it 
more difficult for them to develop and achieve their 
potential." 438 U.S. at 323. That sense of isolation 
particularly inhibits the willingness of many minority 
students to participate freely in class discussions.40 
39 Available on the internet at http://www.stanford.edu/deptJnews/ 
report/news/june16/classday-616.html 
40 See CA.TA 8145-46 (James); Pet. App. 28a; CAJA 432-33, 473; see also, 
e.g., United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996) (noting district court 
finding that 10% female enrollment would be '"a sufficient "critical mass" 
to provide the female cadets with a positive educational experience"') 
(citation omitted). As a result UCLA School of Law, for example, had to 
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D. The Law School's Educational Objectives Are 
Sufficiently Compelling To Satisfy Strict 
Scrutiny 
Petitioners' arguments boil down to the assertion that 
only one interest can be characterized as "compelling": 
remedying an institution's own past discrimination. But this 
Court has steadfastly refused to embrace a rigid 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that would 
preclude "case-by-case" scrutiny of the justifications 
advanced for the consideration of race in this or any future 
case. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part) (recognizing "the possibility that the 
Court will find other governmental interests ... to be 
sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the use of 
affirmative action policies"). As Adarand recently 
confirmed, not all decisions influenced by race are "'equally 
objectionable"' and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a 
framework for "carefully examining" the importance and the 
sincerity of the reasons advanced. 515 U.S. at 228 (citation 
omitted). Those reasons-while certainly few in number-
are potentially as varied and difficult to predict as the 
challenges facing our Nation. 
By way of example, few would question the State's need 
to take race into account when choosing an undercover law 
enforcement officer to infiltrate a racially homogenous 
terrorist cell, or when acting to quell a race riot in a prison. 
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed, 
this Court has recognized a variety of governmental 
interests-from combating corruption to promoting health 
and safety-as sufficiently "compelling'' to justify incursions 
upon other rights to which strict scrutiny applies and which 
decide whether to place one or two_ of the 13 African-American students 
in this year's entering class into each of eight first-year sections (which 
raises educational concerns related to isolati6n) or to place all those 
students into a subset of the sections, creating meaningful diversity there 
but leaving the other sections with no African-American students. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color at 15-16. 
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are, in their own way, no less weighty than those granted by 
the Equal Protection Clause.41 
The Law School's interest in achieving the educational 
benefits of diversity plainly satisfies the standards set by 
this Court. First, race is relevant to a core mission of the 
Law School that is vitally important and plainly 
''legitimate." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-28. Second, the 
program does not use racial classifications as a proxy for 
other more germane considerations, or in a way that 
suggests reliance on impermissible stereotypes that demean 
any racial or ethnic group. Id. at 226. Third, the asserted 
interest in considering race to achieve the -benefits of 
student body diversity has a ''logical stopping point," 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275, sufficient to ensure that it will not 
justify indefinite or unconstrained consideration of race. 
1. As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, the Law 
School's interest in the educational benefits of a diverse, 
racially integrated student body is both unquestionably 
legitimate and "of paramount importance in the fulfillment 
of its mission." 438 U.S. at 313. The cultivation of a diverse 
and vibrant academic environment is the most important 
"'business of a university,"' and the selection of students 
who will best enrich that environment is one of its "'four 
essential freedoms."' Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. N.H., 354 
U.S. 234,263 (1957)). Indeed, "[t]he 'nation's future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas 
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples." Id. at 312-13 (Powell, J.) (quoting Keyi,shian v. Bd. 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). The Law School's 
desire for a diverse student body is at the very core of its 
proper institutional mission.42 
41 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (compliance with§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling 
interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing compelling 
interests in both maternal health and fetal life, at different stages of 
pregnancy); Austin v. Mich. Srote Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990) (compelling interest in reducing political corruption). 
42 In contrast, the interest in ''broadcast diversity" asserted in Metro 
Broadcasting was (at best) on the periphery of the FCC's legitimate 
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Indeed, racial diversity is simply far more relevant to 
the core mission of a university or professional school than 
to virtually any other government endeavor. See Adarand, 
515 U.S. at 227 (race is '"in most circumstances irrelevant"' 
to governmental action and "'therefore prohibited"') 
(quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943)).43 This Court has recognized that universities have 
an unparalleled need for pluralism that is essential to the 
vitality of our society.44 Although the City of Richmond 
could install the finest possible plumbing fixtures in its jail 
using an all-white work force, Croson, 488 U.S. at 481-82, 
this Court recognized in Sweatt and Bakke that the Law 
School cannot provide the finest possible legal education 
with a nearly all-white student body. 
functions and actually threatened to interfere with important First 
Amendment values. 497 U.S. at 616-17 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting). 
43 This Court has frequently held that constitutional doctrines must be 
flexible enough to accommodate the unique needs of the educational 
environment. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southwort,h, 
529 U.S. 217, 231-32 (2000) (First Amendment compelled-speech/funding 
doctrines modified for academic environments); Regents of Univ. of Mich. 
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (due process review of "genuinely 
academic decision[s] ... should show great respect for the faculty's 
professional judgment"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972) 
(student speech rights limited by ''the mutual interest of students, faculty 
members, and administrators in an environment free from disruptive 
interference with the educational process'); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 
263, 268 (1981) ("A university differs in significant respects from public 
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters.'). 
44 See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (Warren, J.); 
id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14 
(Powell, J.). The Law School's desire for the educational benefits of such 
pluralism is not, contrary to Judge Boggs's suggestion, either the moral 
or practical equivalent of the rigid Jewish quotas of an earlier era. The 
Law School does not have a quota of any kind, infra pp. 38-48, and there is 
a world of difference between a policy which strives for some diversity for 
educational reasons-and in which white and ·Asian American students 
compete for all the seats and consistently receive the overwhelming 
majority of them-and one which capped Jewish enrollment at a low, 
arbitrary number, dramatically limiting educational opportunities for no 
purpose other than expressing animus or disdain for Jews. 
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2. The educational interest in a diverse student body 
does not employ historic stereotypes, "directly equate race 
with belief and behavior," or use race as a poor proxy for 
characteristics that could be pursued directly. Metro 
Broad., 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Law 
School does not premise its need for a racially integrated 
student body on any belief that minority students always (or 
even consistently) express some characteristic minority 
viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, breaking down 
such stereotypes is a crucial part of its mission, and one that 
cannot be advanced with only token numbers of minority 
students. Supa p. 26. The Law School values the presence 
of minority students because they will have direct, personal 
experiences that white students cannot-experiences which 
are relevant to the Law School's mission. To the extent 
there are any proxies at work in the Law School's policy, the 
"nexus [is] nearly complete," if not perfect. 497 U.S. at 626 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).45 
The United States reads this Court's cases to hold that 
any recognition that members of racial minorities have 
relevant ''life experiences" rests on an impermissible 
"stereotype." U.S. Br. at 20, 25 n.8. That is plainly 
incorrect. This Court has condemned the fiction that race 
determines a person's ''belief and behavior"46-not the 
inescapable reality that race affects life experiences in our 
society. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 
45 That nexus is certainly much tighter than in Metro Broadcasting, 
where the FCC not only "presume[d) that persons think in a manner 
associated with their race," 497 U.S. at 618, but also that they would insist 
on disseminating that characteristic ''minority" viewpoint regardless of 
market incentives, id. at 626-27. 
46 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (''think alike"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (same); United States v. Va., 518 U.S. at 517 
(stereotypes are '"fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of 
[minorities)"' which are '"likely to ... perpetuate historical patterns of 
discrimination'') (citations omitted) (omission in original). 
31 
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[L]ike race, gender 
matters" in one' s "resulting life experience[s]").47 
3. As the dissenters applying strict scrutiny in Metro 
Broadcasting explained, "[a]n interest capable of justifying 
race-conscious measures must be sufficiently specific and 
verifiable, such that it supports only limited and carefully 
defined uses of racial classifications." 497 U.S. at 613. The 
interest in remedying societal discrimination that Justice 
Powell rejected as "amorphous" in Bakke itself, 438 U.S. at 
307, and in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, plainly failed that test.48 
Because no individual employer or educational institution 
could hope to actually remedy societal discrimination, the 
enormity of that challenge would justify consideration of 
race without any ''logical stopping point."49 
As Justice Powell recognized, the Law School's interest 
in achieving the educational benefits of racial diversity in its 
classrooms is entirely different. Precisely because those 
benefits are educational, any program that genuinely seeks 
to obtain them is constrained by its own logic and by other 
47 As the United States itself explained in an amicus brief to this Court in 
Hopwood at 16 (No. 95-1773), the fact that a minoritY. "student reared in 
this country is likely to have had different life experiences, precisely 
because of his or her race" does not ''rest on impermissible stereotypes; 
... equate race with particular viewpoints; ... [or] presume that all 
individuals of a particular race act or think alike." (Emphasis added.) 
48 Petitioner's suggestion (Pet. Br. at 34) that the "role model" 
justification forwarded in Wygant was directed at "educational benefits" 
is simply incorrect. The school board in Wygant expressed a desire to 
produce minority role models "as an attempt to alleviate the effects of 
societal discrimination." 476 U.S. at 274. As Justice O'Connor recognized, 
that objective "should not be confused with the very different goal of 
promoting racial diversity among the faculty" for educational reasons-
which was not asserted in Wygant. 476 U.S. at 288 n. *. 
49 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (Powell, J.). The FCC's asserted interest in 
''broadcast diversity" in Metro Broadcasting was similarly untethered, 
because the FCC could not "suggest how one would define or measure a 
particular viewpoint that might be associated with race, or even how one 
would assess the diversity of broadcast viewpoints." 497 U.S. at 614 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The interest therefore threatened to justify 
unlimited regulation of broadcasting to produce whatever mix of 
purportedly "racial" viewpoints the FCC chose to identify and favor. 
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pressing educational goals. It would be inconsistent with a 
sincere pursuit of those benefits, for example, to admit 
minority students who are unprepared to ''be the 
intellectual peers of their fellows in the classroom," and 
whose presence would detract from, rather than enhance, 
the learning environment. CAJ A 7756 (Lehman). Those 
benefits can justify the Harvard plan's modest and flexible 
"attention to numbers," but not racial balancing of any 
kind-which Justice Powell famously condemned as 
"discrimination for its own sake." 438 U.S. at 307.50 And, as 
Justice Powell explained in depth in Bakke, it would be 
inconsistent with a genuine interest in the educational 
benefits of racial diversity not to constantly weigh that 
interest against other academic goals-including the 
educational benefits of other kinds of diversity. 438 U.S. at 
315-16. Taken seriously, the educational benefits of racial 
diversity justify only an individualized admissions system 
along the lines of the Harvard plan. 
Finally, petitioner argues that an interest in educational 
diversity cannot be recognized as compelling because it 
would "give the Nation its first permanent justification for 
racial preferences." Pet. Br. at 33. The argument rests on 
an unspoken premise that should not be countenanced. The 
Law School of course recognizes that race-conscious 
programs must have reasonable durational limits, and the 
Sixth Circuit properly found such a limit in the Law School's 
resolve to cease considering race when genuine race-neutral 
alternatives become available. Pet. App. 38a; JA 121; CAJA 
50 As explained above, "critical mass" is an educational concept and the 
range of overall minority enrollments likely to produce it is not "a matter 
for mystical and metaphysical inquiry," Pet. Br. at 31, but a 
straightforward inference from the Law School's desire to have, for 
example, more than one or two African-American and Hispanic students 
in a typical small section. Supra p. 6 & n. 7. That number is not based on 
the percentage of minorities in the population or the applicant pool. The 
Law School's minority enrollment percentages do not correlate with 
Michigan's population, see Respondents' Br. in Gratz v. Bollinger at 48 
n.68, and diverged from the percentages in the applicant pool by as much 
as 17.7%from 1995-2000. SeeJA 156-203; CAJA 1536, 5584, 5586. 
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7750-51. The disparities in academic preparation that make 
such alternatives impossible today are rooted in centuries of 
racial discrimination. The district court found that these 
disparities will eventually be eliminated as our society 
"invest[s] greater educational resources in currently 
underperforming primary and secondary school systems." 
Pet. App. 291a. Any assumption that they are inevitably 
"permanent" merely because three decades of modest effort 
have not yet erased them should not be dignified with a 
place in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
II. THE LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICIES 
ARE NARROWLY TAILORED 
A. There Are No Race-Neutral Alternatives 
Capable Of Producing A Diverse Student Body 
Without Abandoning Academic Selectivity 
Petitioner and the United States assert that there are 
race-neutral alternatives available to the Law School.51 
Many of the ideas they present are not genuinely race-
neutral, and all are demonstrably unworkable . or would 
substitute a different institutional mission for the one that 
the Law School has chosen.52 The Law School has studied 
51 Petitioner also argues that, apart from whether race-neutral 
alternatives actually exist, the district court ''found" that the Law School 
did not in fact consider them. AI!y such finding would be clearly 
erroneous (although review should in fact be de novo because the issue 
was decided on summary judgment, not at trial, see CAJA 99). As the 
Sixth Circuit properly recognized, Pet. App. 33a-34a, the record 
establishes beyond question that the Law School did consider, and 
implement, a wide variety of race-neutral recruiting and outreach 
strategies before and after its adoption of the 1992 policy. See also CAJ A 
401, 358, 7754-55, 7667-78. The district court actually faulted the Law 
School officials only for failing to write memos to the file about or 
"experiment with" options (such as lotteries, percentage plans, and 
lowering academic standards, see Pet. App. 251a) that obviously could not 
work without serious injury to the Law School's other legitimate and 
central educational goals. That was an error of law. Infra p. 34 n.53. 
52 The United States touts the minority enrollments in Florida's 
"graduate, medical, and business schools." U.S. Br. at 16. As the dean of 
Levin College of Law at the University of Florida recently explained, 
race-conscious scholarships have been "crucial" to its (limited) success. 
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this issue for many years, and would like nothing better 
than to find a race-neutral admissions formula that would 
produce meaningful diversity without doing unacceptable 
damage to its other educational goals. Steady improvement 
in the quantitative credentials of the minority applicant pool 
will make such alternatives possible. At this point, 
however, every race-blind alternative requires a dramatic 
sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted 
students, or both. 53 
Recruiting and outreach. The Law School already 
engages in significant recruiting and outreach activities 
targeted at minority applicants, but such efforts have never 
proven sufficient to enroll a critical mass of minority 
students without the consideration of race in admissions. 
CAJA 401, 7668-70. Given the small size of the pool of 
highly qualified potential applicants nationwide, and the 
recruiting efforts already directed at them by the Law 
School and its peers, such efforts have largely become a 
zero-sum competition. They are also not "race-neutral." 
"Percentage Plans." The United States touts 
admissions policies adopted recently by the public 
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida and California, 
which guarantee admission to all students above a certain 
class-rank threshold in every high school in the State. 
There are serious and well-documented problems with that 
approach even for undergraduate schools.54 But the United 
States does not even attempt to articulate how such a 
program could work for graduate and professional schools. 
Mills, Di,versity in Law Schools: Where Are We Headed in the Twenty-
First Century?, 33 U. Toi. L. Rev.119, 129 (2001). 
53 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (alternatives must serve the interest 
"'about as well"' and "'at tolerable administrative expense"') (citations 
omitted); Croson, 488 US at 509-10 (city had a ''whole array of race-
neutral" alternatives because changing requirements with a disparate 
impact ''would have [had] little detrimental effect on the city's [other] 
interests''). 
54 The issue is more relevant to Gratz v. Bollinger, and is dealt with in 
greater detail in the University's brief in that case. See also Brief for 
American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae. 
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No elite law school could responsibly assemble a class 
by guaranteeing admission to every applicant who had 
secured a high grade point average in college, without 
regard to the institution or course of study. Moreover, such 
an approach could not produce meaningful diversity. The 
Law School draws from a national pool and is too small to 
guarantee admission to even a tiny percentage of graduates 
from every university in the country. At the universities 
from which it currently draws the vast majority of its 
students, minorities make up no more than around 3% of the 
students graduating in the top five or ten percent by GP A.55 
The only way to produce a diverse, racially integrated class 
at the law school level through a ''percentage plan" would be 
to limit and gerrymander the undergraduate institutions 
allowed to participate, such that an artificial proportion of 
them were highly segregated majority-minority schools. 
That is not race-neutral. If affirmative action for minority 
students is unconstitutional, then affirmative action for 
minority colleges would be a thin and cynical proxy that 
would be vulnerable under cases like ViUage of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing DevelO]Yment Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977), and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
Indeed, that vulnerability points up a deeper problem 
with the percentage plans at any level of higher education. 
The Law School's current admissions policy considers race 
only as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a 
student body that is diverse in ways much broader and 
richer than race. Because a percentage plan makes that 
kind of nuanced judgment impossible, it effectively sacrifices 
all other educational values-including every other kind of 
diversity. By subordinating traditional admissions criteria 
to a single-minded focus on race, these plans make race the 
"predominant factor" in the design of the entire admissions 
system. E.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,547 (1999). 
Abandon academic selectivity. The United States 
repeatedly suggests that the Law School "eas[e] admissions 
55 Bowen & Rudenstine, Race-Sensitive Admissions: Back to Basics, 
Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 7, 2003, at B7, B9. 
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requirements for all students," and "discard facially neutral 
criteria that, in practice, tend to skew admissions in a 
manner that detracts from educational diversity." U.S. Br. 
at 13-14. Those are in fact the same recommendation, since 
the only facially neutral criteria that the Law School 
considers that have a significant disparate impact on 
minority candidates are academic in nature. 
As the grids and the chart at JA 219 demonstrate, the 
difficulty with such proposals is the composition of the 
applicant pool. There are so many more white and Asian 
American applicants throughout the upper and middle score 
ranges that no incremental lowering of standards will create 
a pool with meaningful racial diversity. Setting the bar so 
low that academic criteria are nearly irrelevant might allow 
a lottery (or academic-blind subjective review) to produce a 
racially diverse class, but any such plan would require the 
Law School to become a very different institution, and to 
sacrifice a core part of its educational mission. 
Socio-economic criteria. The Law School already 
considers the light that a history of overcoming poverty or 
disadvantage may shed on every applicant's likely 
contributions. But if petitioner is suggesting that the Law 
School could enroll a critical mass of minority students by 
giving even greater weight to socio-economic criteria in an 
honestly race-blind manner, the problem is, again, the facts. 
There is a strong correlation between race and poverty 
in our country. Nonetheless, there are still many more poor 
white students than poor minority students in the pool from 
which the Law School draws. "[T]here are almost six times 
as many white students as black students who both come 
from [low socio-economic status] families and have test 
scores that are above the threshold for gaining admission to 
an academically selective college or university."56 Again, this 
is not a way the Law School could enroll an academically 
talented class that is diverse in many ways, including race. 
Boalt Hall recently experimented with admitting more low-
56 Shape of the River 51; see generally id. at 46-52. 
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income students but abandoned that experiment after one 
year, concluding that it could not produce racial diversity.57 
"Experiential diversity." Finally, petitioner and the 
United States suggest that the Law School focus its 
admissions process on identifying those students, without 
regard to race, who have had the particular experiences and 
perspectives that the Law School regards as uniquely 
salient to its academic mission. That suggestion simply 
elides the central question, which is whether the Law School 
would still be permitted to consider "the experience of being 
an African-American, Hispanic or Native American in a 
society where race matters." Pet. App. 35a. If not, this 
proposal could not produce meaningful racial diversity, 
supa pp. 5-6, yet it would deny minority students the 
opportunity to have their own backgrounds and experiences 
"weighed fairly" in the admissions process.58 If so, it is not 
clear how the proposal would differ from what the Law 
School currently does. As Dean Lehman testified, "the 
extent to which we take race and ethnicity into account is 
actually going to vary by individual. And it's going to 
depend on the admissions file, and what they say in their 
essays about who they are, and the extent to which race is 
part [of1 their experiences." CAJA 7755. 
In its efforts to assemble a broadly diverse class, the 
Law School already looks for minority applicants who say 
interesting things about the ways that race has, or has not, 
influenced their lives. It would not, however, endorse an 
57 Moran, Dfoersity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action 
at Boalt Hall, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2241, 2247-48 (2000). 
58 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (Powell, J.). As the Sixth Circuit recognized, a 
focus on "experiential diversity" that willfully ignores experiences 
associated with race would produce "a narrowed and inferior version of 
the academic diversity currently sought by the Law School." Pet. App. 
34a-35a. Judge Boggs's dissent offered no real response, other than 
skepticism that "an experience with [racial] discrimination" was really "so 
much more important than any other experience germane to other legal 
issues." Id. at 120a. As this Court has recognized, "[i]t is not for the 
Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an 
institution of higher learning." Southwonh, 529 U.S. at 232. 
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admissions system that could consider the unique 
contributions that minority applicants can make to the 
educational environment only if they describe their 
experiences as "'victims' of discrimination," Pet. Br. at 37. 
As Gerhard Casper recently put it when explaining his 
support for race-conscious admissions programs at Stanford 
and other selective universities: "[i]n order to survive as a 
sane society, we should not create incentives for ever more 
people to think in terms of victimhood or to play the role of 
victims, or to suggest that one must be disadvantaged to be 
given serious consideration in the college admissions 
process." Casper, Statement on Affirmative Action at 
Stanford University (Oct. 4; 1995).59 
B. The Law School Does Not Employ Quotas Or 
Set-Asides 
Petitioner and her amici repeatedly charge that the 
Law School's admissions process employs a "quota" or 
"effectively reserves" a minimum of 10-12% of the class for 
minority applicants. That accusation may be an error of law 
or of fact (their arguments are too vague to discern which), 
but either way the error is a plain one. If the import of their 
argument is that the structure of the Law School's actual 
policy renders it a "quota" as a matter of law, their use of 
that word in this context is a disguised assault on its 
accepted meaning. If petitioner's contention is that the Law 
School is secretly operating a true rigid minimum "quota" as 
that term has been understood until now, that is not a 
permissible inference from the record. 
1. As the United States correctly explains, "[i]t has 
long been established that, even where the Constitution 
permits consideration of race, it generally forbids the use of 
racial quotas." U.S. Br. at 22. A quota is a policy in which a 
certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are 
"reserved exclusively for certain minority groups." Croson, 
488 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J.). Quotas "'impose a fixed 
number or percentage which must be attained, or which 
59 Available on the internet at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/pres-
provostJpresidentJspeeches/951004affaction.html 
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cannot be exceeded,",oo and "insulate the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the available 
seats.',s1 By contrast, "a permissible goal ... require[s] only 
a good-faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by 
the goal itself,',s2 and permits consideration of race ( or 
gender) as a "plus factor'' in any given case while still 
ensuring that each candidate "compete[s] with all other 
qualified applicants.''63 This Court's affirmative action cases 
frequently invoke, and often turn on, that distinction 
between illegal quotas and permissible goals; it has also 
been incorporated into the extensive regulations governing 
affirmative action in federal contracting.64 
The seminal case for that distinction is in many ways 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which contrasted UC-
Davis's rigid 16-seat quota with Harvard's more flexible use 
of race as a plus factor. Harvard certainly had minimum 
goals for minority enrollment even if it . had no specific 
number firmly in mind. See 438 U.S. at 323 ("10 or 20 black 
students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to 
60 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
495 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concuning in part and dissenting in part) 
(citation omitted). 
61 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J .); see also id. at 305, 319. 
62 Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 495 (O'Connor, J., concuning in part 
and dissenting in part). 
63 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987); see also id. at 656 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (permitting use of gender as a "plus factor'' to 
achieve a stated numerical goal, as long as quotas are avoided and the 
£iolicy does not "automatically and blindly'' promote women over men). 
See generally Brief for the Respondents, Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Mineta (No. 00-730) (Aug. 10, 2001); 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.16(e)(l) 
("Placement goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas, which must be 
met, nor are they to be considered as either a ceiling or a floor for the 
employment of particular groups. Quotas are expressly forbidden."); id. 
§ 60-2.16(e)(3); id. § 60-2.16(a); Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 
Justice, Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's 
Decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (June 28, 1995) ("Post-
Croson affirmative action programs in contracting and procurement tend 
to employ flexible numerical goals and/or bidding preferences in which 
race or ethnicity is a 'plus' factor in the allocation decision, rather than a 
hard set-aside of the sort at issue in Croson."). 
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each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and 
experiences of blacks in the United States"). And Justice 
Powell clearly rejected the suggestion that Harvard's policy 
was ''the functional equivalent of a quota" merely because it 
gave some "plus" for race, or greater ''weight" to race than 
to some other factors, in order to achieve diversity.65 The 
Law School's "virtually indistinguishable" policy therefore 
cannot sensibly be labeled a "quota," at least with regard to 
its design. It is the paradigmatic awosite of a quota as that 
term has been understood until now. Recharacterizing the 
Harvard plan as an illegal quota would overrule not just 
Bakke but also cases like Johnson-and would render every 
affirmative action program nationwide unconstitutional. 
2. Assuming that petitioner and the United States do 
not intend such a radical break with settled law, their 
position must be that the Law School is secretly operating a 
true, rigid minimum quota (in the ordinary, understood 
sense). That is not a permissible inference from the record. 
First, Dean Lehman and the other school officials 
uniformly denied that extraordinary accusation. The 
district court also expressly held that they devised and 
implemented the policy in a good faith effort to comply with 
Bakke and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity-a 
holding that cannot be reconciled with any suggestion that 
they were in fact covertly defying both their own admissions 
policy and well-settled law. Pet. App. 252a-54a. That 
finding has not been challenged in this Court, and the only 
actual facts identified by petitioner and her supporters as 
supporting their extraordinary "quota" accusation are all 
fully consistent with faithful adherence to the written policy. 
65 438 U.S. at 317-18. Instead, Justice Powell explained that a system 
based on a "quota" or its ''functional equivalent" involves a "prescribed 
number" of spaces for minorities or the "total exclu[sion]" of 
nonrninorities from consideration ''from a specified percentage [of spaces) 
... [n]o matter how strong their qualifications." Id. at 315-19; see also id. 
at 318 n.52; Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (flexible programs are ''less 
problematic from an equal protection standpoint because they treat all 
candidates individually rather than making the color of an applicant's skin 
the sole relevant consideration"). 
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Second, petitioner, her amici, the district court, and the 
Sixth Circuit dissenters all claimed to see some type of 
"quota" in the Law School's enrollment numbers, but it is 
telling that they still cannot agree on what that quota is.66 
They also gerrymander the years chosen in order to make 
that range appear tighter than the facts actually show-
entering classes with 42 to 73 minority students between 
1993 and 2000.67 The statistical law of large numbers 
guarantees that there will be a stable range, with a bottom 
identifiable in retrospect, for any characteristic-whether 
the admissions process cares about it or not.68 If the Law 
School conducted an entirely race-blind process there would 
still be a range, with a bottom that skeptical observers like 
petitioner could mistake for a quota. 69 
66 Petitioner suggests the "quota" was 10-12%. Pet. 10. Judge Boggs' 
dissenting opinion claimed it was "around 13.5%." Pet. App. 142a. The 
district court variously suggested that it was 11-17%, id. at 225a, up to 
19.2%, id. at 226a n.26, and 10-17%, id. at 229a-30a. 
67 CA.TA 1536 (1993-98); Record 346, Tr.Exh. 149 at 21, 23 (1999-00). 
Both Judge Boggs (Pet. App.14la-42a) and the United States (U.S. Br. at 
7) focus on the fact that the total number of minority students varied only 
slightly between 1995 and 1998. But, as Judge Boggs conceded (Pet. App. 
142a n.29), outside of that arbitrary window the 1992 policy produced 
iuite substantial variation. See id. at 30a (13.5 to 20% overall). 
By way of comparison, the proportion of students at the Law School 
with last names beginning with "C" in the years from 1999 to 2002 turned 
out to be 6.4%, 6.6%, 6.5%, and 6.4%. The United States also notes (U.S. 
Br. at 15) that African-American enrollment at the University of Texas 
has varied between 3% and 4% in recent years-but apparently does not 
see in that narrow range the operation of a secret quota, even though the 
top-10% plan covers only about half of its admissions process and thus 
leaves room for discretion. See also id. at 16 n.5 ("System-wide minority 
enrollment [in Florida] will remain steady at approximately 36%."). 
69 Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, the district court did not make a 
factual "finding'' that the Law School's policy reserves a certain number 
(or range) of seats for minority students. See Pet. App. 248a ("the law 
school has not set aside a fixed number of seats''). It instead concluded as 
a matter of law that ''there is no principled difference between a fixed 
number of seats" and the practical effect of the Law School's policy 
described above-which the district court characterized as "an essentially 
fixed minimum percentage figure." Id. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the 
district court's finding that the Law School's policy would, as a practical 
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Third, the Law School's hope that its admissions policy 
will produce a critical mass of minority students does not 
make that policy a quota. As the Harvard plan recognized, 
there is of course "some relationship between numbers and 
achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student 
body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable 
environment for those students admitted." 438 U.S. at 323. 
If the Law School did not pay attention to these educational 
concerns, then its policy would not be narrowly tailored to 
the interests it seeks to promote. But "some attention to 
numbers" does not transform a :flexible admissions system 
into a rigid quota. 
Petitioner and the United States emphasize snippets of 
testimony from various witnesses indicating that a critical 
mass would probably be achieved with tolerable frequency 
when total minority enrollments fall within 10 and 20%. 
Even if those numbers are taken to express the Law 
School's official goal (contrary to its written policy and the 
uniform testimony of those very same witnesses), they 
would still be just that: aspirational goals, not quotas. 
The Law School's desire for a "critical mass" of students 
from otherwise underrepresented minority groups is only 
one of many educational goals pursued through the 
admissions policy, and it is at all times weighed against 
other educational objectives. Dean Lehman and the other 
trial witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School 
would and does regularly reject qualified minority 
matter, produce some concrete range of minority enrollments over time. 
Id. at 29a (Proper consideration of race will "over time ... always produce 
some percentage range of minority enrollment. And that range will 
always have a bottom, which, of course, can be labeled the 'minimum.'"). 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed only with the district court's conclusion that 
there is no "principled" (i.e., legal) difference between a policy with that 
effect and a rigid set-aside. Id. at 24a, 29a-32a. Compare Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 476 (1982) (concluding 
that affirmative action program created an "absolute bar" to male 
employee's promotion) with Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38 (reviewing de 
novo and concluding that no candidates were "automatically excluded 
from consideration"). 
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candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass, 
because it believes that assembling a class with exceptional 
academic promise is even more valuable, or because it 
concludes that particular white or Asian American 
candidates will bring other things to the educational 
environment that are, on balance, even more intriguing and 
valuable. See supra pp. 8-9. Petitioner offers no evidence 
that even tends to confirm her charge that the Law School's 
desire for a critical mass is instead an inflexible quota.70 
Petitioner's argument ultimately boils down to a claim 
that any plus program generating a range of minority 
admissions for which the bottom in hindsight approaches a 
meaningful level of racial diversity should be presumed to 
mask a "secret" quota. If a court were permitted to draw 
that inference from the record in this case, then every 
honest Bakke program would be challenged in court on the 
same grounds-and institutions like the Law School could 
avoid losing only by manipulating the process to produce, 
every few years, a class with very few minority students. 
C. The Law School's Consideration Of Race Is 
Individualized, Competitive, Modest In Scope, 
And Does Not Impose An Undue Burden On 
Non-Minority Applicants 
Petitioner's brief points to various statistical measures 
of academic qualifications and odds of admission, and 
concludes that the Law School employs a "plus factor" that . 
is too large. That is not truly a narrow tailoring argument 
at all. Narrow tailoring scrutiny of the size of a ''plus factor" 
70 The fact that the Law School's database kept track of (among other 
things) the racial composition of the developing class, and included that 
data on periodic reports, suggests nothing inappropriate. The Law School 
is required to track the racial composition of its student body and report 
it to the Department of Education, see 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1094(a)(l 7), and to the ABA as part of the accreditation process, see 
ABA Accreditation Standards Interpretation 101-1 (1996). In addition, 
Bakke authorizes admissions officers to pay "some attention to numbers," 
438 U.S. at 323, and the Law School's admissions officers testified without 
contradiction that they never gave race any more or less weight based on 
information in these reports in any event. CAJA 7336. 
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must be focused on the questions to which that issue is 
genuinely relevant: the closeness of the ''fit" between 
means and ends, and the burden imposed on innocent 
parties. The Law School's policy satisfies both standards. 
1. It is important to recognize at the outset that the 
statistical measures relied upon by petitioner cannot bear 
the weight that she places on them. Differences in average 
or median scores are unrevealing for reasons already 
explained. Supra p. 9 n.12~ Petitioner's probabilities and 
"odds ratios"71 within individual cells on her admissions 
grids (or at a given index score) certainly establish some 
attention to race, but are inherently incapable of measuring 
its weight. Because applicants within each cell have (by 
definition) identical quantitative qualifications, even a very 
modest ''tie-brealdng'' plus factor would often produce 
enormous differences in probabilities or relative odds 
ratios.72 In addition, the composite relative-odds ratios (Pet. 
Br. at 9) are highly misleading because this methodology 
required petitioner's statistician to exclude all of the cells (a 
majority of the total) in which white and minority applicants 
were treated the same.73 A methodology that would 
quantify even a tie-breaking plus factor as an "enormous" 
one and exclude all data that reflects equal treatment is 
simply not useful to the constitutional inquiry.74 
2. The bulk of petitioner's narrow tailoring argument 
proceeds as if a "plus factor'' is automatically 
71 "Odds ratios" do not mean the same thing as the "probability" of 
admission. For example, petitioner's statistician explained that an odds 
ratio of 81 means that an applicant was nine times as likely to be 
admitted. Tr. 2:121-23. 
72 CA.JA 7625-28 (Raudenbush). Petitioner's statistician conceded the 
accuracy of this observation. See id. at 7469-70, 8597-99, 7466-67. 
73 CA.JA 7456-58, 7613-14. In 1995, for example, this methodology 
resulted in the exclusion of almost 40% of the minority admissions 
decisions from the analysis. CA.JA 8603-05, 8982, 8595. Indeed, 
petitioner's statistician found statistically significant differences in rates 
of admission only for 21 of the 240 cells in 1995. Tr. 2:143. 
74 The district court approved of the Larntz methodology, Pet. App. at 
227a-28a, but did not actually rely upon it in resolving the narrow 
tailoring issues. Id. at 246a-52a. 
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unconstitutional if it appears to have any significant impact 
upon which students are admitted. To the contrary, a race-
conscious policy that did not meaningfully alter the 
outcomes of the admissions process could not, for that very 
reason, possibly be narrowly tailored. Such a policy would 
incur most of the costs associated with governmental 
consideration of race, while achieving nothing at all. 
The most important "fit" question in this case, 
therefore, is whether the scale of the Law School's plus 
factor is appropriately tailored to the achievement of its 
educational goals. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. On that 
question, the record supplies a clear and undisputed answer. 
A ruling that the Law School must place measurably less 
weight on race will preclude it from enrolling a meaningful 
number of minority students. However one measures the 
scale of the Law School's plus factor, it is clearly the 
minimum required to make the policy, in Justice Powell's 
words, an "effective means" "to the attainment of 
considerable ethnic diversity in the student body," 438 U.S. 
at 315, in light of the current applicant pool.75 
Justice Powell also recognized in Bakke that an 
admissions program does not genuinely ''fit" the interest in 
educational diversity unless it considers race only in the 
context of a genuine commitment to diversity in a ''broad[] 
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or 
ethnic origin is but a single though important element." 438 
U.S. at 315. The program must therefore proceed on an 
"individualized, case-by-case basis," id. at 319 n.53, cannot 
isolate any applicants from competition with all others, and 
must be ''flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements 
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for 
consideration, although not necessarily according them the 
same weight." Id. at 317 (emphasis added). 
75 The pool of high-scoring minority students was much smaller in 1978 
than today; Harvard and similar institutions were necessarily giving a 
substantial plus to minority students in order to achieve that goal. 
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The Law School similarly engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each file, and gives serious 
consideration to all of the ways that applicants might 
contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law 
School does not, of course, accord all such potential 
contributions the same weight, but it does weigh them 
''fairly'' and "place them on the same footing for 
consideration." Id. at 317-18. The Law School's "plus," 
however measured, is far smaller than the disparities at UC-
Davis in Bakke (0.61 to 0.94 points of GP A and 35 to 54 
percentiles on the MCAT), id. at 277 n.7, and the subjective 
diversity contributions of white and Asian American 
students are frequently given similar weight. Supra p. 10. 
It would also indicate a poor fit between the scale of the 
Law School's plus factor and its educational goals if the 
minority students being admitted in fact detracted from 
rather than enhanced its educational environment-or did 
not achieve the kinds of success, and provide the kinds of 
leadership, that the Law School expects from its students 
after graduation. The record in this case conclusively 
dispels such notions. Supra p. 9. 
The idea that minority students themselves are 
somehow injured by being admitted to highly selective 
institutions also wilts under scrutiny. Such students 
graduate at significantly higher rates and earn much more 
in later life than their peers with identical grades and test 
scores who attend less selective schools. Shape of the River 
54-68, 128, 264. Graduates of all races from selective 
institutions support continued u~e of race in admissions to 
achieve diversity by wide margins (much wider than the 
population as a whole), indicating that the consequences of 
such programs were enlightening-not stigmatizing.76 In 
one recent study, 91% of the Law School's graduates 
reported that racial diversity was a positive aspect of their 
76 Shape of the River 118-255, 269; CAJA 2251 (almost 80% of white 
graduates support retaining or expanding race-conscious admissions). 
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experience.77 The Law School's consideration of race is, in 
intent and effect, no more stigmatizing than the "plus" it 
gives to some white students to ensure geographic 
diversity, or to build a community across generations by 
admitting children of alumni. 
3. The Law School's program also does not "unduly 
burden individuals who are not members of the favored 
racial and ethnic groups." Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 630 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell recognized in 
Wygant, the burden imposed by race-conscious "school 
admission[s]" decisions, like the burden imposed by hiring 
goals, ''is diffused to a considerable extent among society 
generally." 476 U.S. at 282,283 n.11. Unlike a job layoff, in 
which ''the entire burden of achieving racial equality" is 
imposed on identifiable individuals, "resulting in serious 
disruption of their lives," an admissions decision "often 
foreclos[es] only one of several opportunities." Id. at 283. 
The Law School of course understands that these 
decisions are enormously important to all of its applicants, 
and that failure to gain admission can be very disappointing. 
But the Law School's consideration of race imposes a burden 
on non-minority applicants so small and "diffuse" that it 
barely affects their chances at all. By way of example, an 
entirely race-blind process would have reallocated an 
average of 41 seats in each incoming class between 1995 and 
2000, CAJA 6047, among the approximately 2200 applicants 
rejected each year. The Law School's policy thus offers 
white and Asian American students a slightly smaller 
chance of attending a school that is thereby able to offer 
them (and others) a substantially better educational 
experience if admitted-hardly an unreasonable burden.78 
77 Orfield & Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences 
in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the 
Impact of Affirmative Action 160 (Orfield & Kurleander eds. 2001); see 
also CAJA 2251, 5870-81, 6210, 6213-18; Brief for Michigan Black Law 
Alumni Society as Amicus Curiae. 
78 Barbara Grutter's application illustrates the point well. Although the 
Law School's consideration of race may have decreased her chances of 
admission slightly in the abstract, if the issue were tried the evidence 
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Moreover, because the Law School's admissions policy is 
typical of those used at law schools nationwide, the handful 
of rejected students who would have been admitted under a 
rigidly race-blind policy may be expected to have gained 
admission to a comparable law school that is itself able to 
offer the benefits of a racially integrated environment. 
The burden imposed on non-minority applicants by the 
Law School's policy is wholly different in nature from that 
created by the FCC programs in Metro Broadcasting. The 
FCC's distress sale program "created a specialized market 
reserved exclusively for minority controlled applicants"; 
literally, a "100% set-aside." 497 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). And because "[t]he basic nonrace criteria 
[ were] not difficult to meet" in the comparative program, 
race was "clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial 
percentage of comparative proceedings"-perhaps 
"overwhelmingly the dispositive factor." Id. at 630-31. 
By contrast, the record demonstrates beyond question 
that academics, not race, is the dispositive factor in the vast 
majority of the Law School's admissions decisions. CAJA 
7476, 7585, 7637; Tr. 2:210-13. The Law School's academic 
criteria are overwhelmingly difficult to meet-so difficult 
that only a small fraction of our Nation's college· graduates 
can meet its standards. From among that group, the Law 
School considers each applicant as an individual and strives 
to admit a student body that will best further its educational 
goals. The Law School (while appropriately conscious of the 
racial and ethnic background of most applicants) has not, in 
other words, subordinated traditional criteria in a way that 
would make race the "predominant factor" in the admissions 
process. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547. 
4. Close scrutiny of the fit between means and ends and 
of the burden on non-minority applicants imposes 
would show that she would not have been admitted even under a rigidly 
race-neutral policy. One hundred and thirty-five other white applicants in 
the same or higher "cells" than Ms. Grutter were rejected along with her 
in 1997; 35 white applicants from lower cells were admitted; and the wait 
list she was on included more than 500 applicants. See JA 175; CAJ A 458. 
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meaningful constraints on the consideration of race within 
the framework established by Bakke. Petitioner's abstract 
contention that the Law School's "plus" is simply too large 
offers no workable alternative. A holding along those lines 
would, as a practical matter, likely preclude any selective 
institution from employing any plus program to enroll 
meaningful numbers of minority students. The difficulty of 
measuring the precise weight given to race versus other 
diversity factors, coupled with the difficulty of articulating a 
reasoned but clear definition of how much weight this factor 
among others may be given, means that such a ruling would 
create far too much exposure to disruptive and costly 
litigation. As Justice Powell properly recognized in Bakke, 
if the standards described above are met-and they are 
here-there ''is no warrant for judicial interference in the 
academic process." 438 U.S. at 319 n.53. 
D. The Law School's Special Attention To African-
Ameriean, Hispanic And Native American 
Applicants Is Based On Reasoned Principle 
Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. at 43) that the Law 
School's policy is illogical and ''haphazard" in the choice of 
racial or ethnic groups for which it shows a particular 
concern. It is not. That policy's objective is to assemble a 
class that is both academically superior and richly diverse in 
a variety of ways that include, but certainly are not limited 
to, race and ethnicity. The Law School therefore pays 
attention to the racial or ethnic background of every 
applicant, to the extent that it sheds any light on their 
experiences and ''likely contributions to the intellectual and 
social life of the institution." CAJA 314; id. at 7783, 7248.79 
79 Petitioner argues that the Law School has drawn a special distinction 
between Puerto Rican applicants born on the mainland and those born in 
Puerto Rico, and between Mexican American and other Hispanic 
applicants. The Law School's pre-1992 system did draw distinctions like 
these, but its current policy was revised to provide a special commitment 
to enrolling a "critical mass" of "Hispanics" generally. Supra p. 10 n.15; 
CAJA 321, 7263 (Munzel, director of admissions), 477 (Dean Lehman). 
Bulletins were printed for several years that failed to reflect the change, 
but that mistake was corrected by 1997. Compare CAJA 1729 wi.th 1885. 
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But the Law School's desire for meaningful numbers of 
African-American, Hispanic and Native American students 
is, in several important respects, unique. By virtue of our 
Nation's unfortunate past and ongoing struggle with racial 
inequality, such students are both uniquely likely to have 
had experiences of particular importance to the Law 
School's mission, and uniquely unlikely to be admitted in 
meaningful numbers on criteria which ignore those 
experiences. The Law School's goal of fostering interaction 
and understanding across traditional racial lines also 
particularly requires African-American, Hispanic and 
Native American students, since those are the groups most 
isolated by racial barriers in our country. For similar 
reasons, the educational pitfalls associated with isolation are 
particularly salient for these students. See supra p. 26. 
If educational experience revealed a similar confluence 
of issues with respect to other discrete ethnic groups, the 
Law School would modify its policy to acknowledge that 
fact.80 Petitioner's complaint that the Law School ignores 
the "dozens of separate racial or ethnic groups" from which 
its white and Asian American students hail is wrong 
(because, as noted, the Law School does consider such 
information) and misses the point. Narrow tailoring does 
not require the Law School to blindly give the same ''plus" 
to every ethnic group it can identify, regardless of its 
salience to the educational mission-and regardless of 
whether members of that group would be well represented 
in the student body anyway. Such a regime would be 
impossibly unwieldy, self-negating, and would serve no 
coherent interest whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, this Court should affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
80 See, e.g., Pet. App. 213a n.15 (recognizing that Asian and Jewish 
Americans are also likely to have had unique experiences because of their 
ethnicity, but that they are "already being admitted to the law school in 
significant numbers" on race-neutral criteria); CAJA 7520-21 (same). 
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